2.1SummaryNationalDefenseStrategy2018Mattis.pdf

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of

The United States of America

Summary of the

National Defense Strategy

Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge

Table of Contents

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………….…. 1

Strategic Environment ………………………………………………………………………….. 2

Department of Defense Objectives ……………………………………………………………… 4

Strategic Approach ……………………………………………………………………………… 4

Build a More Lethal Force ………………………………………………………………. 5
Strengthen Alliances and Attract New Partners …………………………………………. 8
Reform the Department for Greater Performance and Affordability ……………………10

Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………….……….. 11

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

1

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed
to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared
to win. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military
options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength.

Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military
advantage has been eroding. We are facing increased global dis , characterized by decline in the
long-standing rules-based international —creating a security environment more complex and
volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not
terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.

China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing
features in the South China Sea. Russia has violated the b s of nearby nations and pursues veto
power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors. As well, North Korea’s
outlaw actions and reckless rhetoric continue despite United Nation’s censure and sanctions. Iran
continues to sow violence and remains the most significant challenge to Middle East stability. Despite
the defeat of ISIS’s physical caliphate, threats to stability remain as terrorist groups with long reach
continue to murder the innocent and threaten peace more broadly.

This increasingly complex security environment is defined by rapid technological change, challenges
from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness from the longest
continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history. In this environment, there can be no
complacency—we must make difficult choices and prioritize what is most important to field a lethal,
resilient, and rapidly adapting Joint Force. America’s military has no preordained right to victory on
the battlefield.

This unclassified synopsis of the classified 2018 National Defense Strategy articulates our strategy to
compete, deter, and win in this environment. The reemergence of long-term strategic competition,
rapid dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare and competition that span the entire
spectrum of conflict require a Joint Force structured to match this reality.

A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of
allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that
safeguard the free and open international . Collectively, our force posture, alliance and
partnership architecture, and Department modernization will provide the capabilities and agility
required to prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength.

The costs of not implementing this strategy are clear. Failure to meet our defense objectives will result
in decreasing U.S. global influence, eroding cohesion among allies and partners, and reduced access
to markets that will contribute to a decline in our prosperity and standard of living. Without sustained
and predictable investment to restore readiness and modernize our military to make it fit for our time,
we will rapidly lose our military advantage, resulting in a Joint Force that has legacy systems irrelevant
to the defense of our people.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

2

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment,
characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international and the re-emergence of
long-term, strategic competition between nations. These changes require a clear-eyed appraisal of the
threats we face, acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and a transformation of how
the Department conducts business.

The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by
what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China
and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority
over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.

China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce
neighboring countries to re the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its
economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will
continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in
the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. The
most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two
countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.

Concurrently, Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental,
economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change
European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging
technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine
is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the
challenge is clear.

Another change to the strategic environment is a resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international . In
the decades after fascism’s defeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partners
constructed a free and open international to better safeguard their liberty and people from
aggression and coercion. Although this system has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network
of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security. China and Russia are now
undermining the international from within the system by exploiting its benefits while
simultaneously undercutting its principles and “rules of the road.”

Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear
weapons or sponsorship of terrorism. North Korea seeks to guarantee regime survival and increased
leverage by seeking a mixture of nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and unconventional
weapons and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan,
and the United States. In the Middle East, Iran is competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of
influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony, using state-sponsored terrorist activities,
a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives.

Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have
increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of
sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

2

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment,
characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international and the re-emergence of
long-term, strategic competition between nations. These changes require a clear-eyed appraisal of the
threats we face, acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and a transformation of how
the Department conducts business.

The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by
what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China
and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority
over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.

China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce
neighboring countries to re the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its
economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will
continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in
the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. The
most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two
countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.

Concurrently, Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental,
economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change
European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging
technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine
is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the
challenge is clear.

Another change to the strategic environment is a resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international . In
the decades after fascism’s defeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partners
constructed a free and open international to better safeguard their liberty and people from
aggression and coercion. Although this system has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network
of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security. China and Russia are now
undermining the international from within the system by exploiting its benefits while
simultaneously undercutting its principles and “rules of the road.”

Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear
weapons or sponsorship of terrorism. North Korea seeks to guarantee regime survival and increased
leverage by seeking a mixture of nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and unconventional
weapons and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan,
and the United States. In the Middle East, Iran is competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of
influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony, using state-sponsored terrorist activities,
a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives.

Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have
increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of
sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

3

Challenges to the U.S. military advantage represent another shift in the global security environment. For
decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain.
We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate
how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.

We face an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains, and conducted at
increasing speed and reach—from close combat, throughout overseas theaters, and reaching to our
homeland. Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks
and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve
their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion). These
trends, if unaddressed, will challenge our ability to deter aggression.

The security environment is also affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war.
The drive to develop new technologies is relentless, expanding to more actors with lower barriers of
entry, and moving at accelerating speed. New technologies include advanced computing, “big data”
analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—
the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.

New commercial technology will change society and, ultimately, the character of war. The fact that
many technological developments will come from the commercial sector means that state
competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the
conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed. Maintaining the Department’s
technological advantage will require changes to industry culture, investment sources, and protection
across the National Security Innovation Base.

States are the principal actors on the global stage, but non-state actors also threaten the security
environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, trans-national criminal
organizations, cyber hackers and other malicious non-state actors have transformed global affairs with
increased capabilities of mass disruption. There is a positive side to this as well, as our partners in
sustaining security are also more than just nation-states: multilateral organizations, non-governmental
organizations, corporations, and strategic influencers provide opportunities for collaboration and
partnership. Terrorism remains a persistent condition driven by ideology and unstable political and
economic structures, despite the defeat of ISIS’s physical caliphate.

It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. America is a target, whether from
terrorists seeking to attack our citizens; malicious cyber activity against personal, commercial, or
government infrastructure; or political and information subversion. New threats to commercial and
military uses of space are emerging, while increasing digital connectivity of all aspects of life,
business, government, and military creates significant vulnerabilities. During conflict, attacks against
our critical defense, government, and economic infrastructure must be anticipated.

Rogue regimes, such as North Korea, continue to seek out or develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
– nuclear, chemical, and biological – as well as long range missile capabilities and, in some cases,
proliferate these capabilities to malign actors as demonstrated by Iranian ballistic missile exports.
Terrorists likewise continue to pursue WMD, while the spread of nuclear weapon technology and
advanced manufacturing technology remains a persistent problem. Recent advances in bioengineering
raise another concern, increasing the potential, variety, and ease of access to biological weapons.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

In support of the National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense will be prepared to defend the
homeland, remain the preeminent military power in the world, ensure the balances of power remain
in our favor, and advance an international that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.

Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the
Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the
threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase
in the future. Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes
such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate our gains
in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.

Defense objectives include:

 Defending the homeland from attack;

 Sustaining Joint Force military advantages, both globally and in key regions;

 Deterring adversaries from aggression against our vital interests;

 Enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and interests;

 Maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle
East, and the Western Hemisphere;

 Defending allies from military aggression and bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly
sharing responsibilities for common defense;

 Dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring,
proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction;

 Preventing terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the United States
homeland and our citizens, allies, and partners overseas;

 Ensuring common domains remain open and free;

 Continuously delivering performance with affordability and speed as we change
Departmental mindset, culture, and management systems; and

 Establishing an unmatched twenty-first century National Security Innovation Base that
effectively supports Department operations and sustains security and solvency.

STRATEGIC APPROACH

A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national
power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military.
More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space, seizing the initiative to
challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength. A more lethal force,
strong alliances and partnerships, American technological innovation, and a culture of performance
will generate decisive and sustained U.S. military advantages.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

In support of the National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense will be prepared to defend the
homeland, remain the preeminent military power in the world, ensure the balances of power remain
in our favor, and advance an international that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.

Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the
Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the
threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase
in the future. Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes
such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate our gains
in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.

Defense objectives include:

 Defending the homeland from attack;

 Sustaining Joint Force military advantages, both globally and in key regions;

 Deterring adversaries from aggression against our vital interests;

 Enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and interests;

 Maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle
East, and the Western Hemisphere;

 Defending allies from military aggression and bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly
sharing responsibilities for common defense;

 Dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring,
proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction;

 Preventing terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the United States
homeland and our citizens, allies, and partners overseas;

 Ensuring common domains remain open and free;

 Continuously delivering performance with affordability and speed as we change
Departmental mindset, culture, and management systems; and

 Establishing an unmatched twenty-first century National Security Innovation Base that
effectively supports Department operations and sustains security and solvency.

STRATEGIC APPROACH

A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national
power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military.
More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space, seizing the initiative to
challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength. A more lethal force,
strong alliances and partnerships, American technological innovation, and a culture of performance
will generate decisive and sustained U.S. military advantages.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

5

As we expand the competitive space, we continue to offer competitors and adversaries an outstretched
hand, open to opportunities for cooperation but from a position of strength and based on our national
interests. Should cooperation fail, we will be ready to defend the American people, our values, and
interests. The willingness of rivals to abandon aggression will depend on their perception of U.S.
strength and the vitality of our alliances and partnerships.

Be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable. Deterring or defeating long-term strategic
competitors is a fundamentally different challenge than the regional adversaries that were the focus of
previous strategies. Our strength and integrated actions with allies will demonstrate our commitment
to deterring aggression, but our dynamic force employment, military posture, and operations must
introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers. With our allies and partners, we will challenge
competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their
options while expanding our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions.

Integrate with U.S. interagency. Effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions
with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power. We will assist the efforts of the
Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as
the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address
areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerabilities.

Counter coercion and subversion. In competition short of armed conflict, revisionist powers and rogue
regimes are using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies,
and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground. Some are particularly adept at
exploiting their economic relationships with many of our security partners. We will support U.S.
interagency approaches and work by, with, and through our allies and partners to secure our interests
and counteract this coercion.

Foster a competitive mindset. To succeed in the emerging security environment, our Department and Joint
Force will have to out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate revisionist powers, rogue
regimes, terrorists, and other threat actors.

We will expand the competitive space while pursuing three distinct lines of effort:

 First, rebuilding military readiness as we build a more lethal Joint Force;
 Second, strengthening alliances as we attract new partners; and
 Third, reforming the Department’s business practices for greater performance

and affordability.

Build a More Lethal Force

The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one. Doing so requires a competitive approach
to force development and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting readiness and
field a lethal force. The size of our force matters. The Nation must field sufficient, capable forces to
defeat enemies and achieve sustainable outcomes that protect the American people and our vital
interests. Our aim is a Joint Force that possesses decisive advantages for any likely conflict, while
remaining proficient across the entire spectrum of conflict.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

6

Prioritize preparedness for war. Achieving peace through strength requires the Joint Force to deter conflict
through preparedness for war. During normal day-to-day operations, the Joint Force will sustainably
compete to: deter aggression in three key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East;
degrade terrorist and WMD threats; and defend U.S. interests from challenges below the level of
armed conflict. In wartime, the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating aggression by
a major power; deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and
WMD threats. During peace or in war, the Joint Force will deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic
attacks and defend the homeland. To support these missions, the Joint Force must gain and maintain
information superiority; and develop, strengthen, and sustain U.S. security relationships.

Modernize key capabilities. We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s
weapons or equipment. To address the scope and pace of our competitors’ and adversaries’ ambitions
and capabilities, we must invest in modernization of key capabilities through sustained, predictable
budgets. Our backlog of deferred readiness, procurement, and modernization requirements has grown
in the last decade and a half and can no longer be ignored. We will make targeted, disciplined increases
in personnel and platforms to meet key capability and capacity needs. The 2018 National Defense Strategy
underpins our planned fiscal year 2019-2023 budgets, accelerating our modernization programs and
devoting additional resources in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage.

 Nuclear forces. The Department will modernize the nuclear triad—including nuclear command,

control, and communications, and supporting infrastructure. Modernization of the nuclear
force includes developing options to counter competitors’ coercive strategies, predicated on
the threatened use of nuclear or strategic non-nuclear attacks.

 Space and cyberspace as warfighting domains. The Department will prioritize investments in
resilience, reconstitution, and operations to assure our space capabilities. We will also invest
in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full
spectrum of military operations.

 Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).
Investments will prioritize developing resilient, survivable, federated networks and
information ecosystems from the tactical level up to strategic planning. Investments will also
prioritize capabilities to gain and exploit information, deny competitors those same
advantages, and enable us to provide attribution while defending against and holding
accountable state or non-state actors during cyberattacks.

 Missile defense. Investments will focus on layered missile defenses and disruptive capabilities for

both theater missile threats and North Korean ballistic missile threats.

 Joint lethality in contested environments. The Joint Force must be able to strike diverse targets inside
adversary air and missile defense networks to destroy mobile power-projection …